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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JAMES L. HATCH and 
DELLA L. HATCH, 
Pla;intiff 
Defendants 
Case No. 
8937 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
AMICUS CURIAE 
I 
THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE. 
The interest of the United States is not clearly 
brought out in the record or appellant's brief in this case. 
Even though the United States has conveyed all of its 
title to the particular tract of land here involved it, as 
well as other parties to be mentioned, has a very real and 
important interest in the questions presented for decision 
to this Court. The same legal question arises as to hun-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
dreds of instances since May 12, 1919, wherein the State's 
title to school lands has been exchanged for other lands. 
In federal court litigation, to be explained later herein, 
the State has asserted that some 377,000 acres have been 
exchanged with the United States since that date. The 
State has advised the U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
that more than 92,000 acres are in this disputed cate-
gory. Many of these lands are located in southeastern 
Utah where, it may be judicially known, very valuable 
oil deposits have been discovered. The United States 
incorporated many of those sections into the Navajo 
Indian Reservation. That Tribe has executed many leases 
of such former school sections to the Superior Oil Com-
pany and Honolulu Oil Corporation and others. The State 
of Utah has executed competing leases on some 13,719 
acres of land, many of them to Western States Refining 
Company and perhaps others. The financial interests 
of the United States, the Navajo Indians, the Superior 
Oil Company, the Honolulu Oil Corporation and Western 
States Refining Company, none of whom is a party to this 
case, are obvious. 
There is another large class of persons whose inter-
ests may be vitally affected by the decision of tlris case. 
Selection of lands by the State in place of school sections 
is made, for the n1ost part, only when a pri\ate party has 
sought such lieu lands. Thus 1nost, if not all, of the 
377,000 lieu acres have been patented to private interests. 
In this litigation the State contends that it received both 
the minerals in the school lands and the lieu lands as well 
as the surface rights in the lieu lands. ..Alternatively, the 
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State contends that the exchanges should be rescinded 
revesting in it the title to the school sections and return-
ing to the United States the lieu lands. The State's posi-
tion thus jeopardizes the titles of those disputed lands to 
the extent that they had been sold or leased to private 
parties. The interests of the multitude of owners, mort-
gagees, etc., of lands, title to which traces back to such 
grants from the State, will likewise be vitally affected 
by this decision, but they are not here represented. 
So, also, the titles of grantees and lessees from the 
United States, like the title of appellees Hatch, are 
jeopardized by this claim of the State. Although the 
State seeks to restrict its claim to the mineral rights 
(Br. 1), it is inevitable that title to the tract as a whole 
is involved since it is clear that the State is not entitled 
both to whatever minerals there may be in the Hatch 
land as well as the complete fee title to the tract it got 
.from the United States in place of the Hatch tract (infra 
p. 15). 
II. 
THE SITUATION OF FOUR OTHER CASES FILED 
IN THE STATE OR FEDERAL COURTS THIS YEAR 
HAS AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THIS ·CASE. 
Consideration of the entire controversy of which the 
instant case is an integral part requires an understanding 
of three cases pending in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah as well as another case filed with 
this Court but dismissed in April of this year. Chrono-
logically the last-mentioned case was the first one filed. 
It was an original proceeding in this Court seeking a 
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writ of prohibition against the State Land Board. The 
case was filed as No. 8801 on January 13, 1958, under the 
title of Lee v. Henderson. Lee, as assignee of an oil and 
gas lease issued by the United States Bureau of Land 
Management, sought to prohibit the Land Board from 
leasing the same tract of land to Western States Refining 
Company. That Company was permitted to intervene 
to assert that the mineral rights in this tract belonged to 
the State. 
On February 27, 1958, the United States filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah a 
case, United States v. State of Utah, et al., Docket No. C-
21-58, to quiet its title to that tract of land subject to the 
Lee lease. It also sought in the same case an injunction 
against prosecution of Lee v. Henderson. The injunction 
was granted after hearing of March 15, 1958. The court 
held that the Lee case constituted an attempt to adjudi-
cate title to the minerals without the United States being 
a party to the action, that there were federal questions 
involved, and also that, as the court put it, "there are 
elements which strongly suggest" that the Lee case was 
collusive and not between adverse parties. This latter 
statement was based upon facts, developed at the hear-
ing, showing that Lee was a stockholder of Western 
States and a good friend of the Chairman of its Board of 
Directors, Mr. Eliason. Mr. Eliason arranged a test case, 
approached Mr. Lee to use his name on an assignment of 
a lease for that purpose, Western States to pay all ex· 
penses and to secure attorneys for Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee had 
never seen his assignor. The section involved was located 
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a considerable distance from any oil and gas development. 
Mr. McCarthy, counsel for Western States, said that 
Lee's attorney was to act independently and that an ad-
versary proceeding was contemplated. He further stated 
(p. 11, Transcript of Federal Court Hearing, March 15, 
1958, copies of which have been filed with the Clerk of 
this Court): 
At the time this petition was filed, your 
Honor, counsel for Western States Refining Com-
pany and the Attorney General of the State of 
Utah and counsel for Lee all went to see Chief 
Justice McDonough and explained to him exactly 
the nature of this test case, just as I have attempt-
ed to explain it here to your Honor today. 
Justice McDonough, in effect, said that he 
could see nothing objectionable iri the procedure, 
although the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
would have to be affirmed as Lee (sic) (affirma-
tively) demonstrated. 
The case of Lee· v. Henderson was dismissed a few 
days later and the injunction consequently dissolved. 
Pending these proceedings the United States had, on Feb-
ruary 18, 1958, filed the case of United States v. State 
of Utah, et al., Docket No. C-16-58, to quiet title to a sec-
tion 32 alleged to be part of the Navajo Indian Reserva-
tion. The Navajo Tribe had granted a lease to the Hono-
lulu Oil Corporation, which was named a defendant, while 
the State had purported to lease the same land to one 
George N. Larsen who assigned to Western States. The 
third federal case, United States v. State of Utah, et al., 
Docket No. C-40-58, was filed April 14, 1958, involving 
lands within the Navajo Indian Reservation which had 
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been leased by the Tribe to the Superior Oil Company. 
Western States likewise had a purported lease from the 
State on these lands. In the federal court cases, the State 
of Utah, the members of its Land Board, Western States 
and other purported owners of interests under the pur-
ported state leases, Honolulu Oil Corporation and Su-
perior Oil Company are all parties. 
When the injunction was dismissed, defendants in 
the federal court cases had sought to have proceedings 
stayed pending the filing of a proposed declaratory judg-
ment action in the state courts. This was denied. The 
present case was then filed on April 21, 1958. The motion 
to stay federal court proceedings was renewed and a 
hearing was had on July 31, 1958. Government counsel 
there stated that the nearest oil activity to the Hatch 
property was 20 miles away and that so far as he knew 
there was no mineral value to the Hatch land (p. 15, 
Transcript of Hearing, July 31, 1958). He further stated 
that Hatch is a brother of nL ·v. Hatch. a member of the 
State Land Board of the State of l1tal1 and a defendant 
inC 21-58 (id., p. 15). These statements were not contro-
verted at the hearing. Defendants' counsel adnritted that 
federal questions were involved ( id., p. 19). The court's 
reasons for refusing the stay were stated after the argu-
ments as follows ( id., pp. 22-2-1) : 
Now, without deciding the question at this 
point, ordinarily one would expect that, if the 
State of Utah wanted to exchange a school section 
for some other section in the public dmnain, when 
that exchange was 1nade that they are going to 
give just as 1nany rights, including n1ineral, in 
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that section, to the United States as they expected 
to get back in the section they received from the 
United States. That is what one ordinarily would 
expect, whether it was the United States and the 
State dealing or whether it was you and I deal-
ing. If I had a school section and wanted to trade 
it to you for a section that wasn't a school section 
and nothing was said about mineral rights-no-
body thought about it then because there wasn't 
any oil down there discovered in them-one would 
expect that when that was exchanged you would 
get all the rights in the school section and I would 
get all the rights in the other section. 
Now, you are calling my attention to circum-
stances which you say alter this case, and one of 
them is that state statute. But there are a lot 
of others. 
Here you have two parties to an exchange, 
and we are going to have a look into all of the 
circumstances involved, it seems to me. One of 
the important things is that the exchange was 
made with the United States of America. And 
that Garfield case1 is not really the kind of case 
you are concerned with. You are concerned with 
the cases down there in San Juan County and per-
haps other counties where there are valuable oil 
discoveries and those school sections now are very 
valuable things. 
I should think, Mr. McCarthy, that if the State 
is going to decide this case for you it ought to 
decide all of these issues; if this ,Court is going to 
decide this case for you, this Court should decide 
all these issues, because they are irretrievably 
intermingled and tied together-you can't sepa-
rate them. You are trying to try this case piece-
1This refers to the Hatch case which was filed in Garfield Gounty. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
meal; you are trying to get the Supreme Court of 
Utah to decide one little segment of it. It may be 
decisive ; it may not be, I don't know. I don't know 
enough about it yet. And after that you are per-
fectly happy to come back and let us monkey 
around with the rest of it. You are trying that 
case piecemeal. You have one question: Under all 
of the circumstances, including the statutes on 
both sides and everything else, did they reserve 
those mineral rights or didn't they~ 
For some reason you folks think you would 
rather get that matter decided over in the state 
courts, and you are entitled to do it if you can. 
The United States for some reason - and one 
reason the United States is here is perfectly evi-
dent: There are federal questions involved. This 
is the only court where they can have those ques-
tions decided and this is the proper forum for the 
United States to appear as a party either to sue 
or be sued. That is why they are here. I do not 
think the United States is here with any idea that 
this Court's decision is going to be any more or 
less favorable to them. 
I don't know why I should pay any attention 
to that sort of consideration anyway. 
MR. McCARTHY: I agree with your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any at all. It seems to me 
that you have a case here, and we have spent a lot 
of time thinking about it, we have spent a lot of 
tim~ thinking and talking about this. Now, it 
seems to me this is the proper forum to try this 
issue. I don't think it is as narrow an issue as 
you urge. 
The motion to stay was denied and there is now pend· 
ing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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Circuit an application for leave to file a petition for 
a writ of certiorari to reverse this ruling. 
III. 
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The United States believes that the State of Utah 
has waived and relinquished all right, title and interest 
to the former school sections for which it has received 
lieu lands. The federal statutes provide that selection 
of the lieu lands "shall be a waiver of its [the State's] 
right to said sections" [school sections]. R.S. 2275, as re-
enacted by the Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 796, 
43 U.S.C. sec. 851. The relevant portions of various 
federal statutes are printed in the Appendix, infra. The 
Act of May 3, 1902, 32 Stat. 189, 43 U.S.C. sec. 853, 
i'nfra, p. iii, specifically made these provisions for lieu 
selections applicable to Utah. These statutes contem-
plated the exchange of full fee title on an acreage basis 
as stated in section 852, infra, p. ii. No reservation of 
minerals was authorized. The selection lists filed by the 
State to take advantage of these opportunities did not 
purport to reserve any minerals. Clearly any attempt 
to do so would have been rejected by federal authorities 
as not authorized by law. In contrast, the ·Taylor Grazing 
Act, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended 43 U.S.C. sec. 315g, au-
thorized reservation of minerals in exchanges when 
lands mineral in character are involved. 
Many exchanges, both before and after 1919, were 
made without expression of a mineral reservation. The 
State seizes upon the 1919 statutes to argue that the 
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Land Board had no jurisdiction to waive the State's inter-
est in the minerals in the former school sections. We 
think the trial court correctly held that such limitation 
did not apply to school land exchanges. The administra-
tive actions of both state and federal officials confirm 
that view. 
Even if a contrary construction of the 1919 statute 
viewed in vacuo should be taken, we believe that there 
are other reasons why the State's claim to these minerals 
must be rejected. But, as we point out later in detail in 
Point VI, these matters cannot be decided on the record 
of the present case. They relate in part to federal ques-
tions which are here presented and likewise, we believe, 
have a bearing on the proper construction of the Utah 
statute and to the question whether on all the facts the 
statute should be construed so as to nullify many out-
standing titles. 
IV. 
THIS CASE IS NOT CONTROLLED BY UTAH LAW 
At the first hearing in federal court regarding the 
injunction the following colloquy took place between the 
court and Mr. MeCarthy. ·rrho is one of the counsel for 
plaintiff here (Transcript of Henrin!Y, ~farch 15.1958. pp. 
41-42): 
MR. McCARTHY: I respectfully suggest 
there are potential and probable constitutional 
issues. 
THE COlTRT: "\Yhat are the constitutional 
issues 1 
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MR. McCARTHY: For example, under the 
Federal statute under which this exchange was 
made is the provision that exchange of these lands 
constitutes a waiver by the state of its rights. 
Query: Should the question of whether or not a 
waiver has taken place here be determined on 
the basis of state law or should it be determined 
on the basis of a Federal statute~ 
THE COURT: What is the constitutional 
question~ 
MR. McCARTHY: If determined on the basis 
of a Federal statute, I think there is a serious 
question involved as to the right of the Federal 
Government to legislate in a field with respect 
to states rights in these minerals and whether or 
not a certain action constitutes a waiver of the 
states rights with respect to the minerals. 
I think, just as much as there are questions 
in this case of an impairment of the contract, there 
is such a problem involved in this case, the implied 
contract of exchange by which the state offers 
these lands and the Government accepts the lands 
and conveys lieu lands to the state. Also, I have 
no doubt that if the state statutes were construed 
as the State of Utah and Western States Refining 
Company would want them construed, that thA 
Federal Government would be claiming a violation 
of due process, the taking of property without 
due process. I think there are potential constitu-
tional questions, very much so, in this case, your 
Honor. 
See also supra, p. 7, 8. 
While it is not admitted that the constitutional ques-
tions referred to by counsel in the above quoted colloquy 
exist, yet the federal court and all parties before it are 
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agreed that there are federal questions involved. Some 
of them relate to the correct construction of the federal 
statutes. And, of course, the issue whether State law con-
trols is itself a federal question. Plaintiff argues that the 
issue here is the lack of authority of its agents to convey 
minerals to the United States and that this question is 
controlled by local law. But this is a two-party transac-
tion between the State and the United States. Dyer v. 
Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), rejected a similar attempt by 
West Virginia to make its law as to authority of its offi-
cers control performapce of an interstate compact. The 
court said ( p. 28) : 
But a compact is after all a legal document. 
Though the circumstances of its drafting are likely 
to assure great care and deliberation, all avoidance 
of disputes as to scope and meaning is not within 
human gift. Just as this Court has power to settle 
disputes between States where there is no compact, 
it must have final power to pass upon the meaning 
and validity of compacts. It requires no elaborate 
argument to reject the suggestion that an agree-
ment solemnly entered into between States by 
those who alone have political authority to speak 
for a. State can be unilaterally nullified, or given 
final meaning by an organ of one of the contract-
ing States. A State cannot be its own ultimate 
judge in a contro\ersy with a sister State. To 
determine the nature and scope of obligations as 
between States, whether they arise through the 
legislative n1eans of con1pact or the "federal 
common law" gov-erning interstate controversies 
(Hinderlider v. LaPlata Go .. 30± U.S. 92, 110), is 
the function and duty of the Supreme Court of 
the Nation. Of course every deference will be 
shown to what the highest court of a State deems 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
to be the law and policy of its State, particularly 
when recondite or unique features of local law are 
urged. Deference is one thing; submission to a 
State's own determination of whether it has 
undertaken an obligation, what that obligation is, 
and whether it conflcts with a disability of the 
State to undertake it is quite another. 
In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 
(1958), the respondents argued that contracts between 
California irrigation districts and the United States had 
been invalidated under State law controlling the author-
ity of local districts to contract. The United States Su-
preme Court held that the decision of the State Supreme 
Court, in fact, was based on mistaken views of federal 
law and left open the question whether State law could 
control, saying (p. 290) : 
Nor would the suggestion that state law pre-
vented the water districts and agencies of the 
State from entering into the contracts change 
this conclusion. We need not determine whether 
a State could in that manner frustrate the consum-
mation of a federal project constructed at its own 
behest. The fact remains that the state law was, 
in fact, invoked only by the interpretation the 
court gave §8 [of the Federal Reclamation Laws]. 
This argument that local law controlled authority of a 
local entity was also urged in City of Tacoma v. Tax-
payers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958), but not decided because the 
case went off on other grounds. 
Moreover, the exchange transaction whereby the 
State of Utah received other lands in lieu of school sec-
tions was contractual in nature. The construction and 
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effect of federal contracts is governed by federal law. 
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 
(1944); Cle1arjield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 366-367 (1943); Kem-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 
U.S. 110, 121-122 (1954); United States v. Latrobe Con-
struction Company, 246 F. 2d 357 (C.A. 8, 1957), cert. 
den. 355 U.S. 890; United States v. Independent School 
Dist. No. 1, 209 F. 2d 578, 580-581 (1954); American 
Homes v. Schneider, 211 F. 2d 881, 882-883 (C.A. 3, 
1954).2 United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876), relied 
on by appellant, is irrelevant since it rested on the au-
thority of local government to control testamentary dis-
positions. Cf. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87 
(1950). Cases such as United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 
F.2d 1003 (C.A. 5, 1951), and Los Angeles and Salt Lake 
R. Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 435 (C.A. 9, 1944), 
simply applied local law of real property in construing 
deeds from private parties to the United States. The 
present situation where transactions of a contractual na-
ture with the State itself are concerned clearly brings into 
play different principles. And it should be noted that the 
more recent Supreme Court decision in Leiter Minerals 
v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), recognized that 
federal law might control even the title acquired from 
private interests. \Ve find nothing in California v. 
Deseret Water Co .. :2±3 U.S. ±15 (1917), holding that the 
2These dedsions make plain the irrelevancy of Erie R. Co. V. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It was under the mistaken notion 
that the Erie case applied here that the district court said he 
would be obliged to follow lthe State court decisions (Transcript 
of Hearing, July 31, 1958, p. 12). 
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issue presented turned on federal law which supports the 
claim that state law controls here. Newton v. State Bo,ard 
of Land Com'rs, 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053 (1923), cited 
by the State (Br.17-21), was a writ of prohibition against 
the State Board of Land Commissioners before they had 
purported to make any exchanges. The series of trans-
actions between the United States and Utah over the last 
39 years cannot be ignored. The Newton case, if anything, 
tends to confirm our position since it shows that within 
a few years of passage of the 1919 Utah Act a somewhat 
similar question as to authority with regard to school 
lands was raised in an adjoining state. The fact that 
nevertheless the pre-1919 practice as to exchanging 
school lands continued in Utah demonstrates the under-
standing of the participants that the 1919 statute had not 
changed things. 
We want to make it clear that this brief outline of 
some of the federal questions that may be presented be-
fore this controversy is resolved is by no means intended 
to be complete or exhaustive. Other issues may well 
emerge when all of the facts surrounding this series of 
federal-state transactions have been brought to light. 
v. 
THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO BOTH THE 
MINERALS IN THE SCHOOL LANDS AND THE 
FULL FEE TITLE TO THE EXCHANGED LANDS. 
The State admits that under federal law there was 
contemplated an exchange of equivalents. It asserts, how-
ever that, since lands selected were to be non-mineral 
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in character, there was an exchange of equivalents. The 
federal court gave the obvious answer (supra, p. 7) 
when it said that all rights in each section would be ex-
changed since minerals were not known to exist in either 
section. 3 The non-mineral character of the lieu lands 
is determined at the time the State selects them and the 
United States thereby parts with all interests, including 
minerals, later discovered. Wyoming v. United States, 
255 U.S. 489 (1921). The same result applies as to the 
school sections, we submit, since when the State makes 
its selection "Equity then regards the State as the owner 
of the selected tract and the United States as owning 
the other; and this equitable ownership carries with it 
whatever of advantage or disadvantage may arise from 
a subsequent change in conditions whether one tract or 
the other be affected." Wyoming v. United States, 255 
U.S. 489, 497 (1921). Federal law thus prohibits the 
State from retaining any interest in the school section 
and also securing the lieu section. 
VI. 
THE RECORD OF THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT 
ADEQUATE BASIS UPON WHICH TO DECIDE IM-
PORTANT FEDERAL AND STATE QUESTIONS. 
The answer to the federal questions suggested above 
depends to considerable degree on facts not in this record. 
It is extremely important that the conduct, expressions of 
opinion, etr., of both federal and state officers or agen-
sThe Utah school land grant excluded lands known to be mineral. 
United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 562 (1918). 
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cies participating in the exchanges be known. Illustrative 
of the importance of the administrative practice is United 
States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440 (1947), which also shows 
the relevancy of practices in regard to other states. In 
United St,ates v. Burlington, Etc., R.R .Co., 98 U.S. 334 
(1878), the court, speaking of an amendment to a railroad 
land grant, said (p. 341): 
Such has been the uniform construction given to 
the acts by all departments of the government. 
Patents have been issued, bonds given, mortgages 
executed, and legislation had upon this construc-
tion. This uniform action is as potential, and as 
conclusive of the soundness of the construction, as 
if it had been declared by judicial decision. It 
cannot at this day be called in question. 
See also Minnesota Company v. National Company, 3 
Wall. 332, 334 (1865). So here the actions of the State, 
the grantees of the lieu lands, and the subsequent inter-
ests in the chains of title resting on those grants, as well 
as actions of the United States as to school lands, may 
reveal that a situation exists which should not be over-
turned regardless of the correct a priori construction of 
the statute. See also Gate v. Beasley, 299 U.S. 30 (1936). 
Also, it is quite possible that rules of estoppel, laches and 
the like may be applicable to this federal-state contro-
versy. 
We submit that before a multitude of titles is dis-
turbed, as may result from the State's argument, these 
facts should be thoroughly examined. We doubt if de-
fendant Hatch would be willing to undertake the expense 
of the necessary research and presentation of evidence 
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concerning those matters, since no valuable oil and gas 
deposits appear to be contained in his land. We suggest, 
however, that in the federal court cases the resources 
of the United States and the oil companies having a 
direct and important interest in the outcome are available 
and will be used to discover and produce all relevant 
material. This case could properly, we believe, be held 
in abeyance pending such proceedings. 
There is precedent for refusal to decide important 
questions on an inadequate record. In Kennedy v. Silas 
Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948), important issues under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act were presented. The case 
was disposed of on motion for summary judgment. The 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment which the court 
of appeals had affirmed. It said (pp. 256-257) : 
The short of the matter is that we have an ex-
tremely important question, probably affecting all 
cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of 
their employees inunediately, and ultimately af-
fecting by a vast sum the cost of fighting the war. 
No conclusion in such a case should prudently be 
rested on an indefinite factual foundation. The 
case, which eounsel have described as a constantly 
expanding one, c01nes to us aln1ost in the status 
in which it should come to a trial court. In addi-
tion to the welter of new contentions and statutory 
provisions we n1ust pick our way an1ong over a 
score of teehnieal contracts. each a1nending some 
earlier one, w-ithout full baekground knowledge 
of the dealings of the parties. The hearing of 
contentions as to disputed facts. the sorting of 
documents to select relevant provisions, ascertain 
their ultimatP fonn and meaning in the case. the 
practieal construction put on them by the parties 
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and reduction of the mass of conflicting conten-
tions as to fact and inference frorn facts, is a 
task primarily for a court of one judge, not for a 
court of nine. 
We do not hold that in the form the contro-
versy took in the District Court that tribunal 
lacked power or justification for applying the 
summary judgment procedure. But summary pro-
cedures, however salutary where issues are clear-
cut and simple/ present a treacherous record for 
deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this 
Court should draw inferences with caution from 
complicated courses of legislation, contracting and 
practice. 
We consider it the part of good judicial ad-
ministration to withhold decision of the ultimate 
questions involved in this case until this or an-
other record shall present a more solid basis of 
findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive 
statement of agreed facts. While we might be 
able, on the present record, to reach a conclusion 
that would decide the case, it might well be found 
later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should 
precede judgment of this importance and which it 
is the purpose of the judicial process to provide. 
7Rule 56 requires that ~summary judgment ,shall be rendered if 
"there is no genuine issue as Ito any material fact ... '' See 
note 4. 
See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., 339 U.S. 667, 677-
678 (1950). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that either the judgment should be 
affirmed or, if vacated, the case should be remanded and 
held in abeyance pending full development of all relevant 
facts in the federal court proceedings. 
SEPTEMBER, 1958 
Respectfully, 
PERRY W. MORTON, 
Assistant Attorney General 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
United States Attorney, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
C. NELSON DAY, 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROGER P. MARQUIS, 
Attorney, Department of Justicf!, 
Washington 25, D.C. 
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APPENDIX 
R.S. 2275, as re-enacted by the Act of February 
28, 1891, 26 Stat. 796, 43 U.S:C. sec. 851, provides : 
Deficiencies in grants to State by reason of 
settlements, etc., on designated sections generally. 
Where settlements with a view to preemption or 
homestead have been, prior to February 26, 1859, 
or shall thereafter be made, before the survey of 
the lands in the field, which are found to have been 
made on sections 16 or 36, those sections shall be 
subject to the claims of such settlers; and if such 
sections, or either of them, have been or shall 
be granted, reserved, or pledged for the use of 
schools or colleges in the State or Territory in 
which they lie, other lands of equal acreage are 
hereby appropriated and granted, and may be 
selected by said State or Territory, in lieu of such 
as may be thus taken by preemption or homestead 
settlers. And other lands of equal acreage are 
also hereby appropriated and granted, and may 
be selected by said State or Territory where sec-
tions 16 or 36 are mineral land, or are included 
within any Indian, military, or other reservation, 
or are otherwise disposed of by the United States: 
Provided, Where any State is entitled to said 
sections 16 and 36, or where said sections are re-
served to any Territory, notwithstanding the same 
may be mineral land or embraced within a mili-
tary, Indian, or other reservation, the selection 
of such lands in lieu thereof by said State or 
Territory shall be a waiver of its right to said 
sections. And other lands of equal acreage are 
also hereby appropriated and granted, and may 
be selected by said State or Territory to compen-
sate deficiencies for school purposes, where sec-
tions 16 or 36 are fractional in quantity, or where 
one or both are wanting by reason of the town-
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ship being fractional,, or from any natural cause 
whatever. And it shall be the duty of the Secre~ 
tary of the Interior, without awaiting the exten~ 
sion of the public surveys, to ascertain and deter-
mine, by protraction or otherwise, the number o.f 
townships that will be included within such Indian 
military or other reservations, and thereupon th~ 
State or Territory shall be entitled to select in~ 
demnity lands to the extent of two sections for 
each of said townships, in lieu of sections 16 and 
36 therein; but such selections may- not be made 
within the boundaries of said reservations: Pro~ 
vided, however, that nothing in this section con-
tained shall prevent any State or Territory from 
awaiting the extinguishment of any such mili-
tary, Indian, or other reservation and the restora-
tion of the lands therein embraced to the public 
domain and then taking the sections 16 and 36 in 
place therein; but nothing in this proviso shall be 
construed as conferring any right not in this sec-
tion existing prior to February 28, 1891. 
43 U.S.C. sec. 852 provides: 
Selections to supply def~·ciencies of school 
lands. The lands appropriated by the preceding 
section shall be selected fr01n any unappropriated, 
surveyed public lands, not 1nineral in character, 
within the State or Territory where such losses 
or deficiencies of school secti~ns occur; and where 
the selections are to compensate for deficiencies 
of school lands in fractional townships, such selec-
tions shall be made in accordance with the follow-
ing principles of adjushnent, to wit: For each 
township, or fractional township, containing a 
greater quantit~r of land than three-quarters of 
an entire township, one section; for a fractional 
township, containing a greater quantity of land 
than one-half, and not more than three-quarters 
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of a township, three quarters of a section; for 
a fractional township, containing a greater quan-
tity of land than one quarter, and not more than 
one half of a township, one-half section; and for 
a fractional township containing a greater quan-
tity of land than one entire section, and not more 
than one-quarter of a township, one quarter sec-
tion of land: Provided, That the States or Terri-
tories which are, or shall be entitled to both the 
sixteenth and thirty -sixth sections in place, shall 
have the right to select double the amounts named, 
to compensate for deficiencies of school land in 
fractional townships. 
The Act of May 3, 1902, 32 Stat. 189, 43 U.S.C. sec. 
853, provides : 
Selections in Utah to supply defi'cencies of 
school lands. All the provisions of sections 851 
and 852 of this title, which provide for the selec-
tion of lands for educational purposes in lieu of 
those appropriated for other purposes, are made 
applicable to the State of Utah, and the grant of 
school lands to said State, including sections 2 
and 32 in each township, and indemnity therefor, 
shall be administered and adjusted in accordance 
with the provisions of said sections, anything in 
the Act providing for the admission of said State 
into the Union, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Wherever the words "sections 16 and 36" 
occur in said sections, the same as applicable to 
the State of Utah shall read: "sections 2, 16, 32, 
and 36," and wherever the words "sixteenth and 
thirty -sixth sections" occur the same shall read : 
"second, sixteenth, thirty-second, and thirty-sixth 
sections," and wherever the words "sections 16 or 
36" occur the same shall read: "sections 2, 16, 32, 
or 36," and wherever the words "two sections" 
occur the same shall read "four sections." 
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